This case study concerns a system that generated a contentious U.S. State Department report on global terrorism. For over 20 years, the Department produced and published an annual, nonclassified, retrospective Patterns of Global Terrorism report. However, the report for 2003, published on April 29, 2004 was criticized as an attempt to misrepresent data for political advantage. This case is based on official documents, transcripts, and news articles available on the Internet in mid-July 2004. It summarizes the way the situation unfolded and provides a glimpse at how people tried to figure out what happened and how to explain what happened. Although this case occurred in a highly charged political environment, it involves many information system and organizational issues that are important in building and maintaining information systems, especially those that require categorization, coding, consolidation, and interpretation of data regarding customers, employees, sales and service activities, and the surrounding environment.
I. INTRODUCTION

In his
Tim Russert of NBC News raised the issue by playing a video clip of Armitage making his claim about prevailing in the war on terrorism and noting that Congressman Henry Waxman "said that you are manipulating data for political purposes." Powell responded ….. "The data that is in our report is incorrect." … "Something happened in the data collection, and we're getting to the bottom of it. Teams have been working for the last several days and all weekend long. I'll be having a meeting in the department tomorrow with CIA, other contributing agencies, the Terrorist Threat Information Center, and my own staff to find out how these numbers got into the report. Some cutoff dates were shifted from the way it was done in the past. There's nothing political about it. It was a data collection and reporting error, and we'll get to the bottom of it and we'll issue a corrected report. And I've talked to Congressman Waxman." … "When you look at it in hindsight now, and you look at the analysis given to me by Congressman Waxman and these two [professors] , all sorts of alarm bells should have gone off. All sorts of, as I say to my staff, circuit breakers should have dropped when we saw this data, and they didn't. But I don't think there was anything political or policy driven about it. It was just data that was incorrect, or it wasn't properly measured compared to the way it was measured in previous years. And so what we have to do is normalize the data this past year, 2003, in the same way that we normalized data in previous years, and we will be putting out that corrected information as fast as we can." 
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TERRORIST THREAT INTEGRATION CENTER
In his State of the Union address on Jan. 29, 2003 , President Bush announced the creation of a Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC). On the previous day the White House distributed a related fact sheet entitled "Strengthening Intelligence to Better Protect America." 4 Here are selected bullet points from the fact sheet:
• The President announced that he has instructed the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, working with the Attorney General, and the Secretaries of Homeland Security and Defense to develop the Nation's first unified Terrorist Threat Integration Center. This new center will merge and analyze terrorist-related information collected domestically and abroad in order to form the most comprehensive possible threat picture." • "Elements of the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, the DCI's Counterterrorist Center, and the Department of Defense will form a Terrorist Threat Integration Center to fuse and analyze all-source information related to terrorism." • "The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will continue to close the "seam" between analysis of foreign and domestic intelligence on terrorism.
• Specifically, it will:
• Optimize use of terrorist threat-related information, expertise, and capabilities to conduct threat analysis and inform collection strategies.
• Create a structure that ensures information sharing across agency lines.
• Integrate terrorist-related information collected domestically and abroad in order to form the most comprehensive possible threat picture.
• Be responsible and accountable for providing terrorist threat assessments for our national leadership." • The Terrorist Threat Integration Center will be headed by a senior U.S. Government official, who will report to the Director of Central Intelligence. This individual will be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the FBI and the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Homeland Security." • A senior multiagency team will finalize the details, design, and implementation strategy for the stand-up of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center
The "Terrorism continues to destroy the lives of people all over the world; and this report we are releasing today, "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2003," documents the sad toll that such attacks took last year. This report also details the steps the United States and some 92 other nations took in 2003 to fight back and to protect our peoples. Indeed, you will find in these pages clear evidence that we are prevailing in the fight." The term "terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant / targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.
• The term "international terrorism" means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country.
•
The term "terrorist group" means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism. The US Government has employed this definition of terrorism for statistical and analytical purposes since "A close review of the document reveals that the list of significant incidents stops on November 11. This is not because terror stopped for the last seven weeks of the year. In fact, there were multiple international terror attacks after that date -including the deadly bombings of two synagogues, a bank, and a British consulate in Turkey. A State Department representative told my staff that the list was cut off due to a printing deadline."
The State Department's claim that terrorism is on the decline is based solely on a steep decrease in the number of 'non-significant' terror attacks since 2001. According to the data in the report, these attacks have declined more than 90% in two years. But the report does not provide any explanation for how or why this drastic decline in nonsignificant attacks has occurred.
In an effort to understand why the State Department reported that nonsignificant terrorism attacks dropped from 231 in 2001 to less than 21 in 2003, my staff asked for a list of the nonsignificant attacks. The Department, however, refused to disclose either the list of total attacks or the process by which these attacks are selected for inclusion in the list. This leads to the bizarre conclusion that each significant terror attack is detailed in a public report, but information regarding the nonsignificant attacks is withheld from Congress." …"Simply put, it is deplorable that the State Department report would claim that terrorism attacks are decreasing when in fact significant terrorist activity is at a 20-year high."
Waxman's letter concluded with a request that by June 1 the State Department should provide detailed listings of all international terrorist attacks since 1995, should identify the members of the U.S. Government Incident Review Panel, and should explain "the procedures for defining an act as an international terrorist attack and whether those procedures have changed in recent years." The data in the report was compiled by the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which was established in January 2003 and includes elements from the CIA, FBI and Departments of Homeland Security and Defense. Based on our review, we have determined that the data in the report is incomplete and in some cases incorrect. Here at the Department of State, we did not check and verify the data sufficiently.
V. INITIAL RESPONSES
At our request, the Terrorist Threat Integration Center is revising the statistics for calendar year 2003. While we are still checking data for accuracy and completeness, we can say that our preliminary results indicate that the figures for the number of attacks and casualties will be up sharply from what was published. As soon as we are in a position to, we will issue corrected numbers, a revised analysis, and revisions to the report." "The State Department acknowledged Thursday it was wrong in reporting terrorism declined worldwide last year. Instead, both the number of incidents and the toll in victims increased sharply, the department said. Statements by senior administration officials claiming success were based "on the facts as we had them at the time. The facts that we had were wrong," department spokesman Richard Boucher said. We've revisited both the numbers themselves and the way we arrived at them. From the reexamination, we have concluded there were obvious problems with some of the numbers themselves. Events were left out. Some were mislabeled and counted in the wrong categories. Some events were counted twice and some portions of the year were omitted entirely.
I hope it goes without saying that we've already begun the process of improving the way we arrive at these numbers for future reports. The revised figures indicate that our earlier assessment was overly positive in some respects.
… I want to be very clear: We here in the Counterterrorism Office, and I personally, should have caught any errors that marred the Patterns draft before we published it. But I assure you and the American people that the errors in the Patterns report were honest mistakes, and certainly not deliberate deceptions as some have speculated, as I said, when the Patterns was released." Ambassador Black summarized the revised results and then yielded the microphone to John Brennan, Director of the TTIC, who provided background about why the erroneous results occurred:
"Numerous factors contributed to the inaccurate information contained in the 2003 Patterns of Global Terrorism publication. TTIC provided incomplete statistics to CIA, which incorporated those statistics into material passed to the Department of State. The statistics were generated by a longstanding interagency review process and database over which TTIC assumed administrative control in May 2003. No changes were made to that process by TTIC and the same database was used to compile the statistics for the 2003 Patterns publication that was used in previous years.
I must point out that this database is retrospective in focus and is not used to monitor, track or analyze current terrorist threats.
There was insufficient review and quality control throughout the entire data compilation, drafting and publication process, including the inaccurate and incomplete database numbers provided by TTIC. I assume personal responsibility for any shortcomings in TTIC's performance and I regret any embarrassment this issue has caused the Department or the Secretary.
Anyone who might assert that the numbers were intentionally skewed is mistaken. Over the past several weeks, TTIC personnel have conducted rigorous review of the database, computer technology, procedures, interagency process, methodology, criteria and definitions that have been used to compile international terrorism statistics over the past 20 years. This review has exposed serious deficiencies and ambiguities that need to be addressed immediately. As a result, I have directed that the interagency process that has been used to compile statistics and to support the Department in its annual Patterns publication be overhauled and that changes be made in the staffing, database and computer technology involved in this effort."
Brennan implied that performing the analysis for a retrospective annual report was not TTIC's top priority.
"To date, TTIC's technical and analytic focus has been on how we, as a government, can more effectively identify, integrate and correlate intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security and other terrorism-related information to prevent future terrorist attacks. While this focus will remain our number one priority, and we will allocate analytic and budget resources accordingly, we will put in place a system in conjunction with our partner agencies that will provide accurate and meaningful metrics on international terrorist events. The Department must have confidence that whatever information it receives from TTIC is accurate."
Brennan continued by responding to concerns that the method for coding the incidents as significant or non-significant was not applied consistently with previous reports "I would now like to say a few words about the revised statistics, charts and chronologies that are being made available today. When it was brought to our attention that the information in Patterns was incorrect, TTIC staff conducted a thorough review of all reported terrorist incidents that took place in 2003. On the basis of that review, a total of 208 incidents were determined to meet the definition of international terrorism as articulated in Section 2656f of Title 22 of the U.S. Code. One hundred and seventy-five of these incidents met the threshold for Significant Incidents as defined by the Incident Review Panel, known as the IRP, which is an interagency panel established in the early 1980s consisting of representatives of CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State.
Since May of 2003, a member of TTIC has chaired this panel and has voted in cases of tie. The interagency Incident Review Panel is the body that makes the decisions on international terrorist incidents. In addition to the 176 Significant Incidents, TTIC staff identified another 33 incidents that were deemed Non-Significant, according to the definition established by the Incident Review Panel many years ago.
The definitions for Significant and Non-Significant International Terrorist Incidents are included in the material that is being provided today. These 208 total incidents, including the breakdown between Significant and Non-Significant, were then reviewed and validated at a special session of the Incident Review Panel that was convened last week. One final point. Frequently, there is incomplete and often contradictory information available on reported terrorist events. Thus, it is up to the Incident Review Panel to make the best possible decisions on whether incidents meet the established definitions and thresholds, as well as to make informed judgments on the number of casualties involved. The materials being made available today reflect those decisions and judgments."
The reporters at the presentation followed with a lengthy series of questions and answers about a wide range of topics. The following excerpts were selected to emphasize questions and answers that directly or indirectly explain something about the systems that produced the initial report and the circumstances under which it was generated. Lines containing dashes indicate breaks in the chronology within the question and answer session.
QUESTION: I wonder if you gentlemen can tell me --you've accepted responsibility now --is anybody going to be fired or disciplined or has anybody resigned as a result of this very embarrassing mistake that seems to have involved several people in systems and layers?
AMBASSADOR BLACK: Well, I think that we've got a lot of hardworking people doing a lot of different things. And we have been looking at the architecture, the process involved with this. We're going to look at the entire spectrum of how the information is stored, how it's put together both here at the State Department and particularly at the Terrorist Threat Integration Center … And this was an error of commission, but it was one developed over a significant period of time. We're dealing with old equipment and how we store it, being able to extract information out of the computers. We've got to update our equipment. And I think we will be able to develop a product that's more meaningful.
… Obviously, no one would want this to happen. I want to leave you with the sense that these are very hardworking, well-intentioned people that do make mistakes. There is the omission in the chronology -but not in the narrative, but in the chronology, there is an omission from about the 11th of November onwards. And the vote of the Incident Review Panel was --in the process of December --should have been caught clearly. And we're still amazed it was not, but it was not. And not to make excuses, but the people in our shop as well as John's and in other agencies at that time were working around the clock, were not on holiday. We all missed Christmas and the holidays. We were looking at saving lives --as you remember, the aviation threat --we were addressing that and other issues.
----------------QUESTION: Why were [the incidents in mid-November and December] not counted? AMBASSADOR BLACK: A couple of issues here. One is that the initial request that came in at the end of December and early January of the statistics. The Incident Review Panel did not meet until the middle of January in order to review those incidents in the latter half of November and in the month of December. When those incidents were determined to be Significant or Non-Significant, they were input into the database. Now, this database is an exceptionally antiquated database. It has been in use for more than 10 years, one that TTIC inherited and one that we now understand exactly its flaws and its deficiencies.
When they were input and it was input through only two parts of this database, they didn't spill over then to the other side that would actually generate the statistics. They were still captured in the database. Therefore, when the statistics and the chronologies that were built from those statistics were provided to CIA, it only stopped --it only provided those --that information up to the 11th of November. And, therefore, when that information went forward, as I said, there was inattention as far as the quality control and reviewing and seeing whether or not there was a complete statistical run at that time.
QUESTION: That doesn't explain the 8th of November attack in Saudi.
AMBASSADOR BLACK: Well, what I said was then we also --TTIC staff did a thorough review of all the terrorist incidents that were reported in 2003. Some of those incidents were deemed to be not international terrorist incidents. When our staff went back and took a look at them, in fact, they did meet the threshold for international terrorism. So you will see many changes throughout the course of the year as far as incidents that were included in Patterns that had been taken out and new incidents that have been put in prior to November 11th. This is a result of a thorough and constant review over the last two weeks and the analysts involved have scrubbed all of this information and that is why the special Incident Review Panel was convened last week in order to validate that.
QUESTION: But, in plainer English, isn't the answer to that question that this was a computer error?
AMBASSADOR BLACK: It is a combination of things. There was a transition from CIA to TTIC. There was the individual who was responsible for this unit left the position in December and was not replaced, has not yet been replaced. It's a CIA officer who left. There were individual contractors who actually had the inputting responsibilities for the database. Contractors rotated. And so the individual who was in charge of those contractors who left and the contractors then mis-input the new information into the database. So it was a combination of things: inattention, personnel shortages and database that is awkward and is antiquated and needs to have very proficient input be made in order for to be sure that the numbers will spill then to the different categories that are being captured.
QUESTION: Excuse me, if I could follow up? Then the failure, apparently, was that once this flawed information went to the CIA, it was not properly vetted there? And, similarly, it then went to the State Department where it was also not properly, if at all, vetted? Is that what happened? AMBASSADOR BLACK: I will leave it to CIA and State Department to talk about the review that was provided to that information.
QUESTION: Well, we don't have them or we don't have the CIA here. What's your understanding?
AMBASSADOR BLACK: My understanding is that the incomplete and inaccurate statistics that TTIC provided to CIA was then passed on to State Department in its same form.
------------QUESTION: Yes. Ambassador Black, aren't you even now, with the corrected numbers, understating the problem? You said that terrorism --terrorist incidents are down from where they were in 2001. In fact, if you look at Significant events, which are the ones, by definition, that we care about --this is where there are casualties -- --------QUESTION: --which would seem to be the genesis of the errors? It seemed to me that you initially said that the information was correctly inputted into your antiquated database, then for some reason it was not totaled, and then later you said that it was incorrectly inputted.
MR. BRENNAN: No, I did not say it was correctly inputted. I said that there was information that was subsequently inputted into the database that was not generated then when the database was pulsed. So some of the information from November and December was, in fact, input. But, in fact, looking back over the entire year, including that period, there were some incidents that should have been deemed to be international terrorist events. QUESTION: Okay. So it was put in, but it just wasn't counted right, then, once it was put in? MR. BRENNAN: Once it goes into the database, it's another step, in fact, several steps based on this database system that requires the individuals to generate the statistics based on incidents and whether they are Significant, Non-Significant, and casualties, whatever. That extraction process did not work for a combination of database problems, individuals who were not sufficiently trained on that, apparently, and also that there was lack of management oversight there because of the individual who was in charge of that unit left.
------------QUESTION: Just to clarify, the initial failure was the computer and programming input problem that was described by Mr. Brennan, then there was an apparent lack of vetting by the CIA, although you have not said so explicitly. And then, was there also a failure at the State Department to vet the material as received from those sources before you put it out? And has that now changed? Can you describe --can you just clarify that? AMBASSADOR BLACK: We are in the process of changing that and looking at it. Clearly, since I am the one that recommend to the Secretary that this document be published, it is my responsibility that it be error-free. It was not.
We do rely upon the TTIC and the CIA to provide us accurate information. And you've heard from Mr. Brennan about the plans he is making, both in terms of technology and personnel, to do that. But we, in my office, have to do a better job of proofreading what we get, and we obviously didn't do a good enough job of that and we're going to make corrections to do that.
VII. PRESS ACCOUNTS OF THE EXPLANATION OF THE ERRORS
Many press accounts on or shortly after June 22, 2004 discussed the presentation of the revised report and the skeptical questioning of Director Brennan and Ambassador Black. The following excerpts from news accounts were selected because they express additional views of Brennan and Black's explanation of the errors or of the surrounding context. Numerous comments about the national political ramifications of the errors and the new results are not included below. Direct quotations from Brennan and Black are not included because they were presented above. "J. Cofer Black, who heads the department's counterterrorism office, said the report, even as revised, showed "we have made significant progress" in the campaign against international terror." "The corrected report shows that the Bush administration is "playing fast and loose with the truth when it comes to the war on terror," said Phil Singer, spokesman for Sen. John Kerry's presidential campaign. The administration "has now been caught trying to inflate its success on terrorism," he said." "State Department Issues Revised Terrorism Report" 29 by Mary Curtius of the Los Angeles Times included:
"Waxman said that in his telephone conversations with Powell, the secretary was 'outraged' that errors had found their way into the published report." "Yeah, I don't like being picked off first base like that," [Powell] said. "But so far I haven't found malfeasance or any willingness to do wrong on the part of anyone. But we'll tighten up our procedures, but I haven't found anything here that I would say is deserving of firing, if that's the question,"
VIII. GOING FORWARD
As of the end of the case, Colin Powell is surely embarrassed by what happened and also upset that he had to spend his time dealing with errors in a retrospective annual report instead of devoting his energy to crises and important international issues around the world. Looking forward he and his senior staff might decide to fix the system for producing the report in its current form. Alternatively, they might conclude that in its current form and with its current definitions and restrictions the report is basically a bureaucratic exercise that fulfills a decades-old Congressional mandate but fails to reflect today's issues. Powell and his senior staff must deal with difficult national and international issues. Deciding what to do about annual Patterns of Global Terrorism report cannot be a major priority for them, but they still have to decide what to do.
QUESTIONS
1. Take an information system view of the production of the Patterns of Global Terrorism report. Review the case and summarize the system as follows: a. Summarize the main steps in the business process b. Identify the main participants in the system c. Identify the information used and created by the system. d. Identify the technology used by the system. e. Identify the product produced by the system. f. Identify different aspects of the surrounding organizational, political, and security environment that were relevant to the system. 2. The various sources in this case study provide a variety of explanations about how the errors occurred in the original (April 29, 2004 ) version of the report. Identify at least three different reasons that were cited and explain how the reasons are related to information systems and organizations. 
